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This paper examines the role of the Health and Disability Commissioner.  It does so by first describing the 
Commissioner's origins and place in the overall regulatory landscape for doctors in New Zealand.  Different 
frameworks are then described within which the Commissioner's purpose, practice and outcomes can be assessed.  
Applying these frameworks, an assessment is made of the Commissioner's jurisdiction.  Finally, informed by the 
foregoing assessment, this paper examines the regulatory landscape from a broader perspective, making tentative 
proposals for reforms. 
I Summary 
Of the wide range of health care providers
1
 in New Zealand, this paper focusses on medical practitioners 
registered by the Medical Council of New Zealand (MCNZ) (doctors).  The term 'doctors' is readily 
understood and, as a group, they play a central role in the provision of health care. 
This paper examines the role of the Health and Disability Commissioner (Commissioner), who is 
appointed pursuant to the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 (HDC Act).  It identifies that the 
Commissioner's origins and place in the overall regulatory landscape for doctors in New Zealand have a 
strong patient rights focus.  Therapeutic jurisprudence, patient safety/error prevention, patient rights and 
professionalism are then described as analytical frameworks or paradigms against which the outcomes of 
the Commissioner's jurisdiction can be assessed.  The Commissioner's jurisdiction is also looked at from 
the different perspectives of patients, doctors and systems/organisations. 
With this background, a study of the 20 most recent opinions published by the Commissioner which 
involve a doctor is described.  Each opinion was analysed against seven different factors.  The results of 
this study enables conclusions to be drawn about how the Commissioner uses expert evidence, makes 
factual findings, and reaches findings about whether or not a doctor has breached a right under the Code 
of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights (Code).
2
 
Taking into account the results of this study and the identified analytical frameworks, a range of legal 
criticisms of the Commissioner's jurisdiction is then explored and tested.  By applying the identified 
frameworks, the paper concludes that the Commissioner's jurisdiction is currently sub-optimal.  A range 
of existing proposals for change are then canvassed, before the paper describes and puts forward its own 
suggestions.  It is proposed that the Commissioner's jurisdiction should assume a more therapeutic focus, 
with serious conduct taken out of the jurisdiction to be dealt with by the MCNZ. 
It is noted that some of the ideas in this paper raise questions which cannot be answered definitively 
without empirical research.  In medicine, and medical law, the stakes are often high.  Where possible, 
policy should not be implemented without evidence that it will work, and be an improvement of the status 
quo.  Nor however should existing policy remain sacrosanct and unchallenged.  While in some areas of 
public policy there is an unfortunate tradition of the law responding to political imperatives without 
careful analysis and balancing of the affected interests (for example criminal sentencing), a better 
approach is to test policy assumptions with data.  Because the ideas in this paper are untested by 
empirical research, the proposals for reform discussed in part V are necessarily tentative. 
                                                   
1  The term "health care provider" is defined in the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 [HDC Act], s 
3. 
2  Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights) Regulations 
1996. 
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II Background 
A Overview of the Regulatory Framework for Doctors 
While the heath care sector is subject to a wide array of different laws, this paper focusses on the 
professional regulation, and structures for the accountability, of doctors.  The starting point is the Health 
Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003 (HPCA Act).  This provides that a medical practitioner is 
a person registered with the MCNZ.  As the responsible authority for doctors under the Act,
3
 the MCNZ 
is the foremost regulatory institution.  It is a statutory body currently comprised of 12 members:  four 
doctors elected by the profession; four doctors appointed by the Minister of Health; and four laypeople.
4
  
The MCNZ is responsible for prescribing required experience, qualifications and scopes of practice.
5
  In 
part, this is done by reference to professional bodies for vocational registration such as the Royal New 
Zealand College of General Practitioners.  The MCNZ also assesses fitness to practise and applications 
for registration, together with issuing annual practising certificates.
6
  The HPCA Act includes powers and 
processes for reviewing the competence and health of doctors, which allow the MCNZ to impose 
conditions on scope of practice as well as requirements such as retraining.  In certain circumstances, the 
MCNZ may also order the interim suspension of a doctor.
7
 
The HPCA Act also establishes the Health Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal (HPDT),
8
 which hears 
charges brought by either a professional conduct committee of the MCNZ or the Director of Proceedings 
appointed by the Commissioner.  The grounds on which a doctor may be disciplined by the HPDT 
include:
9
 
(a) being found guilty of professional misconduct because of any act or omission that, in the 
judgment of the HPDT, amounts to malpractice or negligence in relation to the scope of 
practice in respect of which the doctor was registered; and 
(b) being found guilty of professional misconduct because of any act or omission that, in the 
judgment of the HPDT, has brought or was likely to bring discredit to the medical profession. 
Where there is a finding against a doctor under one or more of the grounds in s 100 of the HPCA Act, the 
penalties which may be imposed include ordering that the doctor's registration be cancelled.
10
  The HPDT 
functions much like a criminal court, albeit applying the civil standard of proof.
11
 
Another role of the MCNZ is to set standards and guidelines,
12
 which it does so through publications such 
as Cole's Medical Practice in New Zealand
13
 and Good Medical Practice.
14
 
                                                   
3  Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003 [HPCA Act], s 5. 
4  Refer to HPCA Act, s120 and Medical Council of New Zealand "Our Council and senior managers" 
<www.mcnz.org.nz>. 
5  HPCA Act, ss 11–14. 
6  HPCA Act, ss 13–33. 
7  HPCA Act, ss 34–51. 
8  HPCA Act, ss 84–90. 
9  HPCA Act, s 100. 
10  HPCA Act, s 101. 
11  Refer to Z v Complaints Assessment Committee [2008] NZSC 55, [2009] 1 NZLR 1. 
12  HPCA Act, s118. 
13  Ian St George (ed) Cole's Medical practice in New Zealand (12th ed, Medical Council of New Zealand, 
Wellington, 2013). 
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Other structures which doctors may need to interact with following an adverse medical event include: 
(a) an employer such as a District Health Board (including through the conduct of an 
investigation, or undertaking a protected "quality assurance activity" under the HPCA Act
15
 
such as a mortality review committee); 
(b) the Accident Compensation Corporation, which may refer treatment injury claims to other 
authorities where it believes there is a risk of harm to the public;
16
 
(c) the Ministry of Health; 
(d) the regulator under the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992; 
(e) the Health Quality and Safety Commission;
17
 and 
(f) the Commissioner. 
In broad terms, every complaint about a doctor must be referred first to the Commissioner.  While a 
complaint is being dealt with by the Commissioner, the MCNZ may in certain circumstances take interim 
steps against a doctor to protect the public, but nothing else.  Where the Commissioner is not, or is no 
longer, involved, the MCNZ may refer the matter to a professional conduct committee which itself may, 
amongst other things, bring a charge against the doctor before the HPDT.  How the Commissioner deals 
with complaints is addressed below, however following an investigation which concludes that a doctor 
has breached the Code, a charge may be laid either (a) by the complainant before the Human Rights 
Review Tribunal (HRRT); or (b) by the Director of Proceedings before the HRRT (alleging a breach of 
the Code) or HPDT (alleging a breach of the HPCA Act). 
The Commissioner's jurisdiction is therefore central.  It can resolve a complaint; initiate a disciplinary 
process following investigation; or provide a link through to the jurisdiction of the MCNZ.  The 
Commissioner can also prevent or delay the MCNZ from taking disciplinary proceedings of its own. 
B Origins of the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 
As part of the 1988 report of the Committee of Inquiry into allegations concerning the treatment of 
cervical cancer at National Women's Hospital (Cartwright Inquiry), Silvia Cartwright
18
 recommended 
that:
19
 
 The Human Rights Commission Act 1977 should be amended to provide for a statement of 
patients' rights and to provide for the appointment of a Health Commissioner.  The 
Commissioner's role would include: 
 (a) negotiation and mediation of complaints and grievances by patients; 
 (b) heightening the professionals' understanding of patients' rights; 
 (c) the entitlement to seek a ruling or sanctions from the Equal Opportunities 
Tribunal on behalf of a patient or class of patients. 
                                                                                                                                                          
14  Good Medical Practice (Medical Council of New Zealand, April 2013). 
15  HPCA Act, ss 52–63. 
16  Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 284. 
17  Established under the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Amendment Act 2010. 
18  At the time a District Court Judge, now Hon Dame Silvia Cartwright. 
19  Silvia Cartwright Allegations Concerning the Treatment of Cervical Cancer at National Women's Hospital 
and into Other Related Matters (Government Printing Office, Wellington, 1988) at 214.  
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 … The Commissioner should have access to the disciplinary procedures pursuant to the 
Medical Practitioners Act 1968.  … 
The HDC Act was a direct response.  It has been described as one of the Cartwright Inquiry's "most 
important recommendations".
20
  
At the centre of the Cartwright Inquiry was Dr Herbert Green, who was an Associate Professor of 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology at the National Women's Hospital in Auckland.  Green believed that cervical 
carcinoma in situ (CIS) (a precursor or incipient form of cancer) might be benign.  At the relevant time 
the orthodox treatment of CIS was to remove it.  Green endeavoured to test his hypothesis by observing 
CIS in some women over time, rather than treating the condition.  He did this without the consent of his 
subjects.  Retrospective analysis has shown that the women who were observed but not conventionally 
treated were more likely to develop invasive cancer.  While some debate over the statistics persists,
21
 the 
conventional or non-revisionist view is that "Those left with CIS were almost 25 times more likely to 
progress to invasive cancer than those without it."
22
  
The Cartwright Inquiry's reference to the (now repealed) Human Rights Commission Act 1977 is 
evidence of the rights discourse which informed and shaped both the Inquiry and the law and policy 
which grew from its recommendations.  That legislation was an "Act … to promote the advancement of 
human rights in New Zealand"
23
 and the Cartwright Inquiry report refers often to patient 'rights'; for 
example:  "The focus [of informed consent] should be centred on the patient, and not on the doctor.  It is 
a principle designed to protect and preserve the patient's rights, not to protect the doctor from liability."
24
 
In academic writing about the Cartwright Inquiry report, the former Commissioner Ron Paterson
25
 has 
highlighted the final sentence of the chapter that deals with ethics and patient rights:  "The focus of 
attention must shift from the doctor to the patient."
26
  Phillida Bunkle has written of the "feminist voice 
and … extent to which the Inquiry and subsequent reforms grew from the analysis developed by the 
Women's Health Movement which was focussed on systematically safeguarding physical safety premised 
upon respect for the ethical autonomy of patients."
27
 
This paper agrees that the Cartwright Inquiry can be viewed as a triumph of rights-based thinking.  It is 
also accepts the importance of the Cartwright Inquiry as a "watershed in the history of medicine and 
health care in New Zealand",
28
 as well as that "enduring changes"
29
 have resulted from it. 
Re-examining the enduring role of patient rights and how that framework might rub up against other 
ways of looking at the doctor-patient relationship is however worthwhile.  It could be argued that what 
the Cartwright Inquiry wanted was to give patient rights appropriate (and significant) weight, rather than 
                                                   
20  Anne Else "The 'unfortunate experiment' and the Cartwright Inquiry, twenty years on:  why getting it right 
matters" (2010) 24 WSJ 2. 
21  For example, see Linda Bryder A History of the "Unfortunate Experiment" at National Women's Hospital 
(Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2009). 
22  Else, above n 20, at 5. 
23  Human Rights Commission Act 1977, long title. 
24  Cartwright, above n 19, at 136. 
25  Now Professor of Law at the University of Auckland and Ombudsman. 
26  Cartwright, above n 19, at 176; and Ron Paterson "The Cartwright legacy:  shifting the focus of attention from 
the doctor to the patient" (2010) 123 NZ Med J 6. 
27  Phillida Bunkle "Patient-centred ethics, the Cartwright Inquiry and feminism:  Identifying the central fallacy 
in Linda Bryder, A History of the 'Unfortunate Experiment at National Women's Hospital'" (2010) 24 WSJ 8. 
28  David Skegg "Forward" in Joanna Manning (ed) The Cartwright Papers, essays on the cervical cancer inquiry 
1987-88 (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 2009) 7. 
29  Paterson, above n 26. 
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rights becoming the only lens through which medical law is seen.  Indeed, the sentence picked out by 
Paterson was preceded by reference to the relationship between the patient and doctor: 
 In summary, I prefer to advocate a system which will encourage better communication 
between patient and doctor, allow for structured negotiation and mediation, and raise 
awareness of patients' medical, cultural and family needs.  … 
Given this, it might have been better for the Cartwright Inquiry report to say that the focus of attention 
must shift from the doctor towards the patient. 
Following the Cartwright Inquiry, the Bill which became the HDC Act was introduced to Parliament by 
the fourth Labour government in 1990.  After a long and fraught gestation, the HDC Act was eventually 
passed in 1994 by the subsequent National led government.  The first Commissioner, Robyn Stent, was 
appointed near the end of that year.  The HDC Act required the Commissioner to prepare a draft Code of 
Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights for the Minister of Health, which was then prescribed 
by regulations.
30
 
Since its enactment, the HDC Act has been amended twice - in 2003 and 2007.
31
  The 2007 changes were 
technical and minor.  The earlier amendments followed the Review of Processes Concerning Adverse 
Medical Events conducted by Helen Cull QC (Cull Review).  This was an inquiry aimed at informing 
draft legislation intended to improve the framework for regulating health professionals and processes for 
reporting and investigating adverse events.
32
 
The "principal problems" identified by the Cull Review were:
33
 
(a) multiple complaint processes, with different agencies undertaking separate investigations into 
the same incident; 
(b) delays in undertaking investigations; 
(c) no disclosure of information between different agencies; 
(d) no centralised database to detect repeated poor practice; 
(e) no reporting by colleagues of practitioners below an acceptable standard; 
(f) no power to suspend practitioners during an investigation where the public may be at risk; and 
(g) insufficient, and delayed access to, compensation. 
The consequential legislative changes which touched upon the jurisdiction of the Commissioner included 
routing all complaints about health practitioners through the Commissioner in the first instance;
34
 
allowing complaints to be triaged and dealt with at a lower level than full investigation; enabling the 
Commissioner to refer complaints to other agencies that may need to respond to them; and requiring the 
Commissioner to share certain information. 
                                                   
30  Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights) Regulations 
1996. 
31  The Health and Disability Commissioner Amendment Act 2003 and Health and Disability Commissioner 
Amendment Act 2007. 
32  Helen Cull Review of Processes Concerning Adverse Medical Events (Ministry of Health, Wellington, 2001) 
at 5.  Following the Cull Review, the HPCA Act was enacted together with the Health and Disability 
Commissioner Amendment Act 2003. 
33  Cull, above n 32, at 15–16. 
34  HPCA Act, s 64. 
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One of the Cull Review's recommendations not taken up was for a "one-stop shop" approach to 
complaints to be developed and considered as a "long-term solution".
35
  This recommendation was based 
on a conclusion that:
36
 
 There is a need for one investigation process, which can investigate breaches of the Code, 
cross-check ACC entitlements for patients and recommend action where appropriate … all 
relevant complaints/claims on health professionals could be recorded on a centralised 
database … it would minimise the number of investigations and hearings by incorporating 
one investigation with one disciplinary tribunal … 
A lengthy critique of the Cull Review by Jonathan Scragg
37
 rejected this "one-stop shop" proposal on the 
basis that "complaint investigation, discipline, compensation and error prevention" "simply cannot 
operate effectively" when combined as proposed.
38
  Scragg applied a patient safety/error prevention 
framework based on the work of James Reason in the field of human error, commenting that, as a result 
of the Cull Review's "almost exclusive focus on the interests of patients, [it] does not consider adequately 
two other key issues - the role registered medical practitioners (doctors) and systems play in adverse 
medical events."
39
  While to say that the Cull Review did not adequately deal with the role doctors play is 
perhaps unfair, a point well made by the critique is that being disciplined by the Commissioner or MCNZ 
does not necessarily make doctors better at their jobs. 
C The Commissioner's Role and Functions in Greater Detail 
1 General 
The statutory purpose of the HDC Act is "to promote and protect the rights of health consumers and 
disability services consumers, and, to that end, to facilitate the fair, simple, speedy, and efficient 
resolution of complaints relating to infringements of those rights".
40
  Attaining this purpose is pursued in 
four main ways:  the appointment of the Commissioner; the promulgation of a Code; the designation of a 
Director of Proceedings; and the establishment of a health and disability services consumer advocacy 
service. 
The Commissioner's statutory functions include those set out below,
41
 which have been categorised here 
according to judgements made by this paper about the core purpose of each: 
Function Purpose 
To promote respect for and observance of the rights of 
consumers, including awareness of such rights and the means by 
which they may be enforced. 
Rights advocacy. 
To act as the initial recipient of complaints about providers, and 
to ensure that each complaint is appropriately dealt with. 
First-stop shop for complaints. 
To investigate, on complaint or on the Commissioner's own 
initiative, any action that is or appears to be in breach of the 
Code. 
Rights enforcement/investigation/discipline. 
                                                   
35  Cull, above n 32, at 28–29.   
36  Cull, above n 32, at 89–90. 
37  Jonathan Scragg "A critique of 'The Review of Processes Concerning Adverse Medical Events'" (2003) 9 
Canta LR 37.  
38  Scragg, above n 37, at 76. 
39  Scragg, above n 37, at 39. 
40  HDC Act, s 6. 
41  HDC Act, s 14. 
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To refer complaints, or investigations on the Commissioner's 
own initiative, to the Director of Proceedings for the purpose of 
deciding whether or not any further action should be taken (such 
as proceedings before the HRRT). 
Rights enforcement/discipline. 
To make recommendations to any appropriate person or authority 
in relation to the means by which complaints involving alleged 
breaches might be resolved and further breaches avoided. 
Rights advocacy/patient safety. 
To make suggestions to any person in relation to any matter that 
concerns the need for, or the desirability of, action by that person 
in the interests of the rights of consumers. 
Rights advocacy/patient safety. 
To report to the Minister from time to time on the need for, or 
desirability of, legislative, administrative, or other action to give 
protection or better protection to the rights of consumers. 
Rights advocacy. 
It can be seen from this that the Commissioner's array of functions devolves into several different 
purposes which may, in some cases, pull in different directions.  These can be put in context by looking 
at the Commissioner's own views about the role's purpose:
42
 
 Our vision is to have "Consumers at the centre of services", reflecting the aim of the Health 
and Disability Commissioner legislation "to promote and protect the rights of consumers". 
 Accordingly, HDC champions consumer-centred health and disability services for New 
Zealand so that all services are delivered with care, competence, and compassion.  We 
believe that this country should lead the world in promoting and protecting health and 
disability services consumers' rights. 
This suggests that, in the Commissioner's view, patient rights may come before other objectives such as, 
for example, patient safety or facilitating a safety culture. 
Turning to the complaints themselves, it is likely that many issues between consumers and doctors are 
resolved directly without input from any third party.  Many complaints are also resolved with the 
assistance of the consumer advocacy service that is required and mandated by the HDC Act.
43
  For those 
complaints which reach the Commissioner, the resolution pathway commences with a preliminary 
assessment.  The Commissioner may then take one or more of the following courses of action:
44
 
(a) to refer the complaint to another agency or person (for example to the MCNZ for interim 
action if a doctor's competence, fitness to practise or appropriateness of conduct is in doubt); 
(b) to refer the complaint to an advocate for resolution; 
(c) to call a mediation conference; 
(d) to investigate the complaint; and/or 
(e) to take no further action on the complaint. 
Where an investigation is commenced, the responsible authority (being the MCNZ for doctors) may not 
take any action under Part 4 of the HPCA Act until that process comes to an end.  As noted above, this 
has a delaying effect in cases where a complaint has been made.  Only once any formal investigation by 
                                                   
42  Anthony Hill Statement of Intent 2013/2016 (Office of the Health and Disability Commissioner, June 2013) at 
8. 
43  For example, see Anthony Hill Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 2012 (Office of the Health and 
Disability Commissioner, October 2012). 
44  HDC Act, s 33. 
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the Commissioner is complete can a charge be laid by a professional conduct committee before the 
HPDT, or by the Director of Proceedings before the HPDT or HRRT.    
An overview of the Commissioner's functions can also be gained from the annual reports required by the 
Crown Entities Act 2004.  The Commissioner's most recent annual report covers the 2011/12 year, during 
which 1,564 complaints were received, of which approximately 600 were about individual doctors.
45
  The 
publicly available data does not include how many of those complaints resulted in investigations, but 
during the 2011/12 year, of the 1,380 complaints "closed" by the Commissioner, 44 were by investigation 
(as opposed to, for example, being closed by a decision under s 38(1) of the HDC Act to take no 
action).
46
 
In general terms, the trend over time has been of increasing numbers of complaints, but decreasing 
investigations and low numbers of referrals to the Director of Proceedings.  This is shown in the 
following tables, assembled for the purposes of this paper from data in the Commissioner's annual 
reports:
47
 
 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
Complaints received 1292 1360 1573 1405 1564 
Investigations completed 100 112 51 27 44 
Referrals to the Director of 
Proceedings 
22 22 5 4 8 
Limited referral to the Director of Proceedings is coupled with few charges against doctors being 
prosecuted by professional conduct committees before the HPDT.  Over the 2008-12 calendar years, the 
HPDT has reported the following numbers of decisions involving medical practitioners:
48
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Charges laid by professional conduct 
committee 
6 4 10 6 3 
Charges laid by Director of 
Proceedings 
1 1 1 - 2 
Unresolved - - 1 - 1 
There has been some criticism of the picture this paints of complainants' access to justice in the sense of 
accountability/sanction and restoration.
49
   While all complaints are routed through the Commissioner, 
                                                   
45  As opposed to other types of "health care providers" that fall within the Commissioner's jurisdiction.  Refer to 
the HDC Act, s 3. 
46  Hill, above n 43. 
47  Hill, above n 43; Anthony Hill Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 2011 (Office of the Health and 
Disability Commissioner, October 2011); Anthony Hill Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 2010 
(Office of the Health and Disability Commissioner, November 2010); Ron Paterson Annual Report for the 
year ended 30 June 2009 (Office of the Health and Disability Commissioner, September 2009); and Ron 
Paterson Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 2008 (Office of the Health and Disability Commissioner, 
September 2008). 
48  Health Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal "Tribunal's Decisions - Medical Practitioners" <www.hpdt.org.nz>.  
Note that the year indicates when the proceeding was commenced.  Data about who laid the charge is not 
available until the proceeding is concluded. 
49  For example, see Joanna Manning "Access to justice for New Zealand health consumers" (paper presented to 
the Health and Disability Commissioner Medico-Legal Conference:  A Decade of Change, Wellington, March 
2010); and Wendy Brandon "Complaints against medical practitioners" [2001] NZLJ 249.  
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only a small number result in formal investigation and, short of judicial review, a complainant has no 
remedy against a decision not to investigate.  Only complaints that are investigated and result in an 
opinion finding a breach of the Code can move on to the HRRT.  While the subject matter of a complaint 
can be taken up by the MCNZ after it has been moved through the Commissioner's jurisdiction 
(irrespective of the outcome), consumers have no direct access to professional conduct committees or the 
HPDT. 
In a relatively recent conference paper, Joanna Manning argued that the Commissioner should adopt a 
clear policy on when formal investigations will be commenced;
50
 and that consumer access to the HRRT 
should be liberalised by amending the HDC Act.
51
  Wendy Brandon has also highlighted that "the 
number of charges heard by the Tribunal is a fraction of the number of complaints and charges previously 
dealt with by the Medical Council".
52
  In the same article she questioned whether low level resolution of 
complaints is appropriate given the power imbalance usually present in doctor-patient relationships;
53
 and 
asked, with reference to "therapeutic jurisprudence",
54
 whether formal hearings and sanction have a role 
to play in healing aggrieved consumers.
55
  This paper will ask some of the same questions. 
2 Process of investigation by the Commissioner 
Once a decision to investigate has been made, the Commissioner must inform any doctor to whom it 
relates of the details of the complaint and the doctor's right to submit a written response.
56
  As soon as 
reasonably practicable after completing an investigation, the Commissioner must advise the doctor of the 
results of the investigation, as well as any further action the Commissioner proposes to take.
57
 
If, following an investigation, the Commissioner is of the opinion that any action was in breach of the 
Code, the available responses include referring the doctor to the Director of Proceedings; making 
recommendations to the doctor; and reporting the Commissioner's opinion, with reasons, to any person 
considered appropriate.
58
 
In general terms investigations can be conducted as the Commissioner sees fit, subject to some limited 
procedural safeguards.  All a doctor can insist on under the HDC Act is to be told the details of a 
complaint; submit a written response; and make a written statement in answer to any proposed adverse 
comment.
59
 
In 2000 the Commissioner wrote an article describing the process of being "under investigation".  This 
included:
60
 
 In practice, doctors are almost invariably sent a copy of any written complaint … However, 
requiring the level of factual and legal specificity expected in disciplinary or criminal 
                                                   
50  Manning, above n 49, at 13. 
51  Manning, above n 49, at 20–21. 
52  Brandon, above n 49.  The "Tribunal" Brandon refers to is the then Medical Practitioners Disciplinary 
Tribunal, which replaced the Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee in 1995. 
53  Brandon, above n 49, at 249–250. 
54  Therapeutic jurisprudence is discussed below in part III of this paper. 
55  Brandon, above n 49, at 249–252. 
56  HDC Act, s 41. 
57  HDC Act, s 43. 
58  HDC Act, s 45. 
59  Refer to the HDC Act, ss 59 and 67. 
60  Ron Paterson "Under investigation by the Commissioner" (31 May 2000) Health and Disability Commissioner 
<www.hdc.org.nz>. 
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charges would not be appropriate for investigations of possible breaches of the Code.  
Parliament clearly intended a simpler process. 
 The HDC investigation notification letter will invite you to make a written response within 
21 days.  … a legalistic response is unnecessary and may be unhelpful.  … You should also 
forward copies of all relevant documentation, including clinical records for that patient, and 
respond promptly to HDC requests for such information. 
 … The HDC is not a court of law, and evidence is rarely heard on oath and is not subject to 
cross-examination … 
 It is likely that the HDC investigator assigned to your case will telephone you to clarify any 
points that remain in issue.  … After the initial fact gathering stage, the HDC's usual next 
step is to request independent advice from a peer.  … 
 Ultimately, it is for the Commissioner to form an opinion, on the basis of expert advice 
where necessary (and it will almost invariably be needed in cases involving standards), 
whether a patient's rights have been breached.  All relevant parts of the expert advice will be 
included in the HDC opinion.  … Current practice is to send a covering letter with the 
provisional breach opinion inviting comment on the findings and recommendations, usually 
within 10 working days of receipt. 
Combined with a review of the Commissioner's published opinions, this confirms that the investigative 
process is largely written.  While some parties may be interviewed (particularly the complainant), 
recordings or transcripts will not necessarily be made available.  This is in stark contrast to the HPDT, 
which requires prior evidence exchange and witnesses to appear in person. 
III Framework for Analysis 
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that the Commissioner's jurisdiction was established with patient 
rights in mind, and this remains at the centre of the Commissioner's work.  It can also be seen that 
differing perspectives on how to evaluate the Commissioner's jurisdiction, its purpose and value exist.  
The most prominent of these perspectives are therapeutic jurisprudence, patient safety/error prevention, 
patient rights and professionalism.  These are not ethical or moral frameworks, but operate at a higher 
level as paradigms against which to measure the outcomes of different laws and policies.  As world 
views, these approaches inevitably inform the way those who ascribe to them experience and value 
different parts of the regulatory framework for doctors. 
The fact that medical law is subject to competing paradigms has been written about by Mark Hall.  In one 
of several articles discussing the potential for unifying principles, Hall argues that medical law "has in 
recent years entertained two competing paradigms - the patients' rights approach and the law and 
economics approach."
61
  While this paper will examine the former, it does not address the latter.  The 
level of state involvement and the way in which medical care is funded in New Zealand makes it 
inherently unlikely that the field can be regulated in the market by consumers making purchasing 
decisions.  Indeed, Hall rejects the unifying potential of both of these paradigms on the basis that "they 
imagine a patient who does not exist".
62
  He argues that medical encounters are not transactional, but part 
of an on-going web of relationships:
63
 
 A relational web perspective … views medical encounters more holistically, as part of a 
larger context formed by the parties' interactions with each other and their relationships with 
other individuals and institutions. 
Further ways of analysing medical law (if not paradigms in the same sense as the four frameworks 
discussed below) include techniques such as comparative institutional analysis, "which contends that the 
                                                   
61  Mark Hall and Carl Schneider "Where is the 'there' in health law?  Can it become a coherent field?" (2004) 14 
Health Matrix 101 at 102. 
62  Hall and Schneider, above n 61, at 102. 
63  Hall and Schneider, above n 61, at 103. 
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pursuit of any substantive goal is necessarily mediated through different institutional processes that will 
affect outcomes, so that institutional analysis is required and such analysis must be comparative."
64
  Yet 
another approach is suggested by Wendy Mariner as a conceptual framework for describing medical law:  
"It is not a theory, nor a set of normative standards, but a description - an architecture, if you will."  
Mariner's architecture endeavours to "offer a blueprint for identifying the principles worthy of 
consideration in identifying and analysing legal issues affecting health".
65
 
Hall has proposed what he calls an "essentialist" approach to medical law, which starts by identifying the 
essential features of medicine that distinguish its legal issues from other fields.
66
  The essential features 
proffered by Mark Hall are:
67
 
 • the experience of being a patient - illness, vulnerability, suffering, and in need 
of care; 
 • the professionalism of health care providers - professing a higher ethic, 
submitting to a social compact, and engaging in a learned practice; 
• the treatment relationship between patients and providers, consisting of very 
large measures of trust, dependency, authority, and caring; 
• the existential stakes of medical care - death, disability, and the essence of being 
human; 
• the nature of medical practice, especially its uncertainty, complexity, and 
technology; 
• the high cost of care and wide variability of need, which necessitate public or 
private insurance that fundamentally alters medical economics. 
It is noteworthy that the first five of these features (combining the fourth and fifth) line up with the four 
paradigms this paper will limit itself to. 
A Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Therapeutic jurisprudence was first developed in the field of mental health law.  David Wexler has said it 
is:
68
 
 … the "study of the role of the law as a therapeutic agent".  It focusses on the law's impact 
on emotional life and psychological well-being.  … therapeutic jurisprudence is a 
perspective that regards the law as a social force that produces behaviours and 
consequences.  … [It] wants us to be aware of this and wants us to see whether the law can 
be made or applied in a more therapeutic way so long as other values, such as justice and 
due process, can be fully respected. 
Specific to medical law, Hall has developed ideas from therapeutic jurisprudence in his search for a 
unifying theme.
69
  He has observed that therapeutic jurisprudence "invites us to think instrumentally and 
empirically about the law, rather than in terms of intrinsic rights or a priori principles";
70
 and "therapeutic 
                                                   
64  Gregory Shaffer "Comparative Institutional Analysis and a New Legal Realism" (2013) Wis L Rev 607 
(forthcoming). 
65  Wendy Mariner "Toward an architecture of health law" (2009) 35 AJLM 67. 
66  Mark Hall "The history and future of health care law:  an essentialist view" (2006) 41 Wake Forest L Rev 347. 
67  Hall, above n 66, at 358. 
68  David Wexler "Therapeutic Jurisprudence:  An Overview" (2000) 17 Cooley L Rev 125.  In this passage 
Wexler is quoting from David Wexler and Bruce Winick Law in a Therapeutic Key:  Developments in 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence (Carolina Academic Press, 1996).  Wexler and Winick are regarded as founders of 
the therapeutic jurisprudence concept. 
69  Mark Hall "Law, Medicine and Trust" (2002) 55 Stan L Rev 463. 
70  Hall, above n 69, at 467. 
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goals should be primary considerations in a body of law that arises from and governs a common 
enterprise whose central objective is individual health and well-being."
71
 
Hall has developed this further to argue persuasively for trust as his unifying agent.  He describes a 
deeply personal type of trust as the core, defining characteristic of the doctor-patient relationship.
72
  This 
paper accepts that the therapeutic benefits of trust can be intuitively recognised at a human level without 
reference to empirical data.  In other words "It is uncontroversial that trust in a caring relationship 
facilitates healing".
73
 
While Hall does not propose trust as a trump suit, he does conclude that its pervasive and fundamental 
importance to medicine makes it a unifying concept that ought always to be taken into account; 
particularly when medical law "can (and does) enforce trust-related expectations, punish violations of 
trust, facilitate the psychology of trust, and undermine trust."
74
 
B Patient Safety/Error Prevention 
This could be described as the practical paradigm.  Its focus is the reduction of acts and omissions which 
cause harm.  This framework has grown from recognising that patients can be and are harmed by doctors; 
the influential work of Reason;
75
 and the application of Reason's human factors/safety systems approach 
to medical care.
76
 
In relation to medicine, Reason has said "it is important to recognise that health care possesses a number 
of characteristics that set it apart from other hazardous domains.  These include the diversity of activity 
and equipment, a high degree of uncertainty, the vulnerability of patients, and a one to one or few to one 
mode of delivery."
77
  This can be contrasted with, for example, a nuclear power station where the mode 
of delivery generally involves many trained individuals focussed on one well-planned process with 
multiple designed safeguards. 
Reason proposed a model of 'organisational accidents' that distinguishes between 'active failures' and 
'latent conditions'.
78
  Latent conditions are the defensive gaps in systems that allow a hazard to present 
itself to a human.  Active failures are the unsafe acts of that human (whether they be simple errors or rule 
violations) which allow the hazard to then cause an adverse event.  For example, a hazard is 
administering the wrong gas to an anaesthetised patient.  A latent condition might be having the right and 
wrong gas present in the operating theatre and equipment that allows both to be connected to the patient's 
breathing apparatus.  An active failure is the anaesthetist not checking carefully and connecting the 
wrong gas.  The adverse event is the consequential harm to the patient.  
The patient safety/error prevention paradigm is not focussed on the rights of the harmed patient or the 
moral culpability of the anaesthetist, but rather on what can be done to reduce the likelihood of a similar 
event occurring again.  The paradigm seeks the development of a 'safety culture' where an absence of 
                                                   
71  Hall, above n 69, at 468. 
72  Hall, above n 69, at 470–71. 
73  Hall, above n 69, at 480. 
74  Hall, above n 69, at 525 (emphasis added). 
75  James Reason Human Error (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990). 
76  LT Kohn, JM Corrigan and MS Donaldson To Err is Human:  Building a Safer Healthcare System (National 
Academy Press, Washington DC, 2000). 
77  James Reason "Beyond the organisational accident:  the need for 'error wisdom' on the frontline" (2004) 2 
Qual Saf Health Care 28. 
78  For example, see Reason, above n 77. 
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blame encourages all adverse events and near misses to be socialised and become opportunities for 
improving systems.   
The safety culture model is universal in the aviation industry, and looked to as an example for 
medicine.
79
  In this context it has been suggested that that:
80
  
 … the sole objective of the investigation of an accident or incident shall be the prevention of 
accidents and incidents.  It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability. 
The need for patent safety/error prevention thinking in New Zealand is underscored by research which 
estimated 12.9% of studied New Zealand hospital admissions were associated with an adverse event (a 
rate that compared to 16.6% in Australia and 10.8% in the UK).
81
 
C Patient Rights 
The evolution of patient rights in New Zealand has already been discussed in relation to the origin of the 
Commissioner and the Code. 
In contrast with therapeutic jurisprudence, it could be said that rules like the Code are more concerned 
with trustworthiness (adherence to standards) than with maintaining trust itself.  This point has been 
made by Hall, who has also observed that publicity around suboptimal behaviour by doctors may not 
restore trust:  "More plausibly, however, such publicity has just the opposite effect, since highlighting the 
very worst in the profession casts seeds of doubt about all physicians.  The law is not concerned with 
these consequences because its only intent here is to hold physicians to a level of performance that it 
considers trustworthy."
82
 
Nevertheless, rights are an important lens through which individuals see the world and their place in it.  It 
is also possible that rights-based thinking lies behind at least some of the motivations patients experience 
in response to adverse events.
83
 
D Professionalism 
Medical professionalism has a long lineage - from the Hippocratic Oath to the Declaration of Geneva,
84
 
which includes the promise to "practise my profession with conscience and dignity" and that "My 
colleagues will be by sisters and brothers".  Along with other professions, such as law, medicine has 
traditionally been regarded as having a social function that separates it from ordinary occupations and 
trades.  Until relatively recently, this 'separateness' went hand-in hand with professional self-regulation. 
                                                   
79  Kathleen Callaghan and Graham Hunt "Making 'safety' the focus of investigations into adverse events in 
health care" (2010) 123 NZ Med J 99. 
80  Callaghan and Hunt, above n 79.  The quoted text is from the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 15 
UNTS 295 (opened for signature 7 December 1944, entered into force 4 April 1947), Annex 13. 
81  Peter Davis and others "Adverse events in New Zealand public hospitals I:  occurrence and impact" (2002) 
115 NZ Med J 271.  A detailed discussion of the quality of medical care and rate of preventable adverse 
events in New Zealand is also included as part of Jonathan Coates "Improving the quality of health services:  
Is the regulatory framework up to the task?" (PhD Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 2005). 
82  Hall, above n 69, at 492. 
83  For example, see Charles Vincent, Magi Young and Angela Phillips "Why do people sue doctors?  A study of 
patients and relatives taking legal action" (1994) 343 Lancet 1609; Marie Bismark and Edward Dauer 
"Motivations for medico-legal action, Lessons from New Zealand" (2006) 27 Journal of Legal Medicine 55; 
and Marie Bismark and others "Accountability sought by patients following adverse events from medical care:  
the New Zealand experience" (2006) 175 Can Med Assoc J 889. 
84  "WMA Declaration of Geneva" World Medical Association <www.wma.net>. 
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The authors of one defence of medical professionalism argue that it is a "structurally stabilising, morally 
protective force in society."
85
  For example, "professional groups, through the establishment of standards, 
education, and peer review, can go a long way toward supplying quality assurance."
86
  Their model of 
professionalism is that it requires a moral commitment to the ethic of medical service/a devotion to 
medical service and its values; the normative act of a public profession of this ethic; and engagement in a 
political process of negotiation, in which professionals advocate for health care values.
87
 
This paper suggests that one of the reasons professionalism remains important is that it is likely to be how 
many doctors see their world.  If professionalism does motivate doctors, then laws which undermine it 
may adversely affect the quality of the medical workforce over time.  
E A Balanced Approach? 
While each of these frameworks can be applied in isolation, none excludes any application of the others.  
No single law can simultaneously respond to and secure the benefits of all the values presented by these 
different frameworks.  They can each be used as analytical tools to test the efficacy of our existing laws 
and, if necessary or desirable, craft new ones. 
The potential advantages of synthesis have been written about - for example finding a "third way" that 
taps both professionalism and developments in patient safety.
88
   Others have written about the need to 
balance 'no blame' with accountability, developing a 'just culture' which differentiates between 
blameworthy and blameless acts.
89
 
Charlotte Paul has warned against external morality (regulation) usurping internal morality, which she 
describes as "those values, norms, and rules that are intrinsic to the practice of medicine."
90
  Paul 
concludes that "There needs to be a place for both external and internal morality and an effort to 
understand their connection.  In New Zealand we face the danger of reducing one set of norms and values 
to another, so that there is only external morality.  We are finding that external controls are blunt 
instruments in particular cases and require a functioning internal morality to interpret them."
91
 
This paper endeavours to take a balanced approach by using all four of the frameworks outlined above to 
shed light on the Commissioner's jurisdiction. 
                                                   
85  Stephen Latham and others "Medical Professionalism in Society" (1999) 341 N Engl J Med 1612. 
86  Latham and others, above n 85, at 1613. 
87  Lathan and others, above n 85, at 1613. 
88  Randall Bovbjerg, Robert Miller and David Shapiro "Paths to Reducing Medical Injury:  Professional 
Liability and Discipline versus Patient Safety - and the Need for a Third Way" (2001) 29 J Law Med Ethics 
369. 
89  Robert Wachter and Peter Pronovost "Balancing 'no blame' with accountability in patient safety" (2009) 361 N 
Engl J Med 1401. 
90  Charlotte Paul "Internal and external morality of medicine:  lessons from New Zealand" (2000) 320 BMJ 499. 
91  Paul, above n 90, at 502. 
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IV Analysis of the Commissioner's Jurisdiction 
A Perspective of Patients 
The work of Marie Bismark and others has examined what patients seek from the complaints process.  
Bismark and Edward Dauer have argued that the motivations behind deciding to take legal action 
following a medical injury, while all representing a demand for some form of accountability, generally fit 
into four themes.  These are:
92
 
(a) restoration, including financial compensation or some other intervention to 'make the patient 
whole again'; 
(b) correction, such as a system change or competence review to protect future patients; 
(c) communication, which may include an explanation, expression of responsibility or apology; 
and 
(d) sanction, including professional discipline or some other form of punitive action. 
In New Zealand the first of these themes is muted somewhat by the availability of compensation under 
the Accident Compensation Act 2001.  While civil proceedings before the HRRT for breach of the Code 
allow damages to be sought,
93
 where the relevant person has cover under the Accident Compensation Act 
2001, only punitive damages will be claimable.
94
 
Bismark and Dauer's analysis is validated to some extent by a study of 154 injured patients whose 
complaints were sufficiently detailed to allow them to be coded.  The following results were obtained:
95
  
Form of accountability sought by the complainant % of complainants 
Communication 39.6 
Explanation 33.8 
Apology, expression of responsibility 9.7 
Correction 50.0 
Lessons learned, system change 45.4 
Review of provider's competence 6.5 
Restoration 22.1 
Compensation for economic losses 18.2 
Intervention with care or waiting lists 3.9 
Sanction 12.3 
                                                   
92  Bismark and Dauer, above n 83. 
93  HDC Act, ss 52(1), 54 and 57. 
94  HDC Act, s 52(2). 
95  Bismark and others, above n 83, at 891. 
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Professional discipline 8.4 
Other punitive measure  5.2 
(Percentages do not add up to 100 because complainants could seek more than one outcome.) 
Less well studied is the degree to which the Commissioner's jurisdiction satisfies these motivations.  As 
part of its 2011 annual report, the Commissioner surveyed a random sample of consumers and providers 
who had participated in the complaint process.  The results were that 81% agreed their complaints were 
taken seriously, and 73% were satisfied that the Commissioner had managed the complaint well.
96
  This 
paper suggests that more empirical research on the experiences (as opposed to the motivations) of 
complainants is warranted.  For example, a comparison of those patients whose complaints were resolved 
through advocacy or mediation, as opposed to formal investigation and opinion. 
B Perspective of Doctors 
Doctors take the Commissioner's investigations seriously.  One study has reported the profound effect a 
patient complaint has on a doctor's personal and professional self-worth, concluding:
97
   
 Some effect on practice is expected following a complaint.  The profession's regulatory 
processes are intended to ensure that doctors do change their practices.  However, the 
change is expected to be positive, to remedy dangerous or disrespectful care, and to ensure 
that future patients benefit from the process.  This study suggests there is doubt as to 
whether these assumed benefits necessarily accrue. 
The Medical Protection Society (a stakeholder in the regulatory framework for doctors), has written that 
"Findings made by the HDC can have a devastating impact on a doctor's professional and personal life".
98
  
This is consistent with research which has found that receiving a complaint has a significant negative 
impact on a doctor, with no evidence that the receipt of a complaint improves the delivery of patient 
care.
99
  There has also been academic consideration of whether the jurisdiction is a negative influence on 
developing safety culture, with a focus on disclosure and learning from mistakes.
100
  That research 
concluded "The overall impression of the complaint experience … is generally negative … Only a small 
minority of respondents felt that they or the patient had gained anything from the complaint."
 101
 
The court has held in Stubbs v Health and Disability Commissioner (Stubbs)
102
 that the Commissioner 
"has no authority to take any action affecting … providers' rights or liabilities".  In other words, if the 
Commissioner's opinions mean little, why should doctors worry about process?  This paper does not 
accept that assessment.  While the Commissioner's powers are limited, they include the ability to name 
doctors and, through a finding of breach, expose them to the jurisdiction of the HRRT.  Furthermore, as 
noted above, the human impact of the Commissioner's opinions can be very real and significant.  This is 
                                                   
96  Hill Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 2011, above n 47,at 7.  
97  Wayne Cunningham and Susan Dovey "The effect on medical practice of disciplinary complaints:  potentially 
negative for patient care" (2000) 113 NZ Med J 464.  See also Wayne Cunningham and Susan Dovey 
"Defensive changes in medical practice and the complaints process:  a qualitative study of New Zealand 
doctors" (2006) 119 NZ Med J 2283. 
98  Denys Court "Response to former HDC's editorial 'Lessons from complaints'" (2010) 123 NZ Med J 128. 
99  Wayne Cunningham "The immediate and long-term impact on New Zealand doctors who receive patient 
complaints" (2004) 117 NZ Med J 972. 
100  Refer for example to Richard Tapper, Laurence Malcolm and Frank Frizelle "Surgeons' experiences of 
complaints to the Health and Disability Commissioner" (2004) 117 NZ Med J 975. 
101  Refer for example to Tapper, Malcolm and Frizelle, above n 100. 
102  Stubbs v Health and Disability Commissioner HC Wellington CIV-2009-485-2146, 8 February 2010 at [33] 
per Ronald Young J. 
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likely amplified by the publicity usually associated with the publication of opinions.  Peter Skegg has 
observed that "Media, providers and the wider public appear unaware of the very limited legal 
consequences that flow from a Commissioner opinion, or that they are reached by a process that would 
not be thought acceptable with the most minor criminal charge."
103
 
More practically, a finding that the Code has been breached will almost invariably result in the doctor 
having a 'record' with the MCNZ.  Skegg has written of other potential consequences as well.  He 
suggests that sometimes peers will learn of an investigation and the Commissioner's opinion, or 
aggrieved patients will provide a doctor's name to the media.  "Furthermore, many people working in the 
health and disability sector place high importance on doing their best for those in their care, so an 
independent assessment that they have failed their patient can be devastating, even if it does not become 
widely known."
104
 
All of that said, research has also shown that "doctors strongly support society's right to complain, having 
lay input into the process, [and] achieving a sense of completion for both parties".
105
  In a similar vein, 
John Jarvis and Frank Frizelle have written:
106
 
 The complaints system has a purpose, and that is to maintain trust between society and the 
medical profession, act as a voice for patients, provide the opportunity for reconciliation and 
closure between doctor and the complainant, and to maintain standards of patient care. 
C Perspective of Systems 
The change that the Commissioner aims to contribute to New Zealand includes safe and high quality 
health services.
107
  This paper suggests that the principal modes by which this might be achieved are: 
(a) complaints changing the behaviour of specific doctors; 
(b) the Commissioner's opinions and other educational activities changing the behaviour of 
doctors generally, and/or the health care systems within which doctors work; 
(c) the specific recommendations made as part of the Commissioner's opinions; or 
(d) the existence of a complaints jurisdiction of itself motivating doctors to provide safer, higher 
quality services. 
While these means have a 'common sense' quality to them, there is little or no research showing that the 
Commissioner's jurisdiction does result in the desired outcomes or change systems and the organisations 
within which doctors work.  Skegg has written that "There are grounds for scepticism about the extent to 
which the data available in Commissioner opinions can assist with the improvement of practice 
generally".
108
  Other authors have similarly concluded "The implication is that health care overall is made 
                                                   
103  Peter Skegg "A fortunate experiment?  New Zealand's experience with a legislated code of patients' rights" 
(2011) 19 Med L Rev 235 at 258. 
104  Skegg, above n 103, at 260. 
105  Wayne Cunningham "New Zealand doctors' attitudes towards the complaints and disciplinary process" (2004) 
117 NZ Med J 973. 
106  John Jarvis and Frank Frizelle "Patients' complaints about doctors in surgical training" (2006) 119 NZ Med J 
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better through the process of receiving reports of care that are perceived to be inadequate.  We could find 
no evidence that this assumption has been tested."
109
 
While it is true that any recommendations made as part of the Commissioner's opinions are almost 
always implemented by the relevant provider (resulting in system improvements),
110
 error by error, case 
by case changes in response to specific complaints is a slow and inefficient way to improve overall safety 
performance. 
D Review of Commissioner's Opinions 
One of two published studies of the content of the Commissioner's opinions is by Sara Temelkovski and 
Kathleen Callaghan.
111
  As well as collecting some basic data about timing and the parties to the 
investigation, the Commissioner's findings were analysed against the 'domains of competence' set out in 
Good Medical Practice.
112
 
1 Method 
A study with some similarities to the work by Temelkovski and Callaghan has been undertaken for this 
paper.  The 20 most recent opinions published on the Commissioner's website were selected for analysis, 
commencing with the most recent as at 1 September 2013, and moving consecutively back in time until 
20 opinions were found.  Opinions that did not involve a doctor were excluded. 
The following aspects of the opinions selected for study were analysed: 
(a) if an expert had been engaged to provide advice about whether a doctor had breached right 
4(1) of the Code ("Every consumer has the right to have services provided with reasonable 
care and skill"); 
(b) whether the Commissioner's opinion was consistent with any advice received from an expert 
engaged by him; 
(c) whether the doctor submitted any independent expert evidence; 
(d) what, if any, comment was made about onus/the burden of proof; 
(e) whether the Commissioner made a material factual finding that was in dispute between the 
complainant and doctor; 
(f) what follow-up actions were taken; and 
(g) whether a doctor was found to have breached right 4(1) of the Code and, if so, how. 
2 Results 
The study's results are fully presented in an appendix to this paper.  In summary: 
(a) The Commissioner engaged one or more experts in 19 of the 20 opinions (95%).  The only 
exception was a complaint concerning a breach of sexual boundaries which, if true, was 
                                                   
109  Cunningham and Dovey "The effect on medical practice of disciplinary complaints:  potentially negative for 
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clearly a breach of rights under the Code.  Of the 19 opinions for which an expert was used, 
six (32%) involved the use of the Commissioner's 'in-house' clinical advisor (an employee), 
rather than an independent person. 
(b) In every case where an expert was engaged, the Commissioner's opinion was consistent with 
the advice received. 
(c) Three of the opinions (15%) indicated that expert evidence had been submitted by a doctor.  In 
one of those cases the expert was a professional colleague at the same hospital, rather than 
being completely independent. 
(d) None of the opinions discussed evidential onus or the burden of proof.  Eight of the opinions 
(40%) did however refer to the standard of proof.  All eight adopted the civil standard by 
referring to the "balance of probabilities" (1); "more likely than not" (5); or both (2). 
(e) The Commissioner made one or more material factual findings which required a person's 
evidence to be rejected in seven opinions (35%).  The relevant doctor's evidence was preferred 
in only one of those seven instances. 
(f) Every opinion was sent to the MCNZ together with the name of any doctor involved, 
regardless of whether or not the Commissioner had concluded that the Code had been 
breached.  It was also common for a doctor's name to be disclosed to the relevant District 
Health Board and professional body for vocational registration.  In nine cases (52% of the 17 
opinions which concluded that the Code had been breached by a doctor) the Commissioner 
also "recommended" or "requested" that the MCNZ undertake a performance assessment.  
Four of the opinions referred a doctor to the Director of Proceedings.  Each of these related to 
a breach of sexual boundaries and involved disputed material factual findings. 
(g) Across all 20 opinions, a total of 48 separate breaches by a doctor of a right under the Code 
were found.  Nineteen of these (40%) were a breach of right 4(1). 
3 Discussion 
Assuming the 20 opinions analysed are a representative sample (no testing was done to determine 
statistical significance),
113
 it is relatively common for the Commissioner to choose between conflicting 
evidence about material issues of fact.  This is surprising given that the Commissioner's process does not 
necessarily allow for the subject of the investigation to hear all of the evidence.  Nor is the cross-
examination of witnesses provided for.  Each of the opinions concerning alleged breaches of sexual 
boundaries required the Commissioner to make a contested factual finding.  The potential unfairness of 
this is significant given the gravity of the allegations and the Commissioner's practice of always 
disclosing the name of any doctor to the MCNZ.  The utility of conducting an investigation is also 
doubtful when subsequent prosecution by either the Director of Proceedings or a professional conduct 
committee seems inevitable.  While one potential benefit might be to encourage an early guilty plea 
(thereby sparing the complainant from having to give evidence in person), the price of blackening a 
doctor through a potentially unfair process is a high one.  If subsequent charges are defended, then the 
Commissioner's process may have an anti-therapeutic effect by adding to the complainant's stress and 
delaying resolution of the factual contest. 
In relation to how doctors engage with the investigative process, it is possible that the inevitability of 
being reported to the MCNZ may encourage defensive behaviours.  Along similar lines, the relatively 
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common use of an in-house clinical advisor to determine whether right 4(1) of the Code has been 
breached may give doctors the impression that they are not being judged by their peers in the true sense. 
Another interesting aspect of the study was the grounds on which it was concluded that right 4(1) of the 
Code had been breached.  It appears that the standard of "reasonable care and skill" is a high one in the 
Commissioner's jurisdiction, and arguably a counsel of perfection.  What degree of skill and care the 
common law requires of doctors has been well litigated in the civil courts of analogous jurisdictions such 
as England.  In England, a doctor is required to meet the standard of the ordinary skilled practitioner 
exercising and professing to have the special skill in question.  An error of judgment will not amount to 
negligence unless it is one that would not have been made by a reasonably competent practitioner with 
the standard and type of skill of the defendant, acting with ordinary care.  Where there are differing and 
well established professional schools of thought on an issue, a doctor will not be regarded as negligent in 
following one rather than another, even if the outcome suggests that the wrong choice was made.  
However, in certain circumstances, treatment will be held to be negligent if it cannot be demonstrated to 
the satisfaction of the court that the body of opinion relied on is reasonable or responsible.  Deviation 
from normal practice is not necessarily evidence of negligence.  To establish liability on that basis it must 
be shown (a) that there is a usual and normal practice; (b) that the defendant has not adopted it; and (c) 
that the course in fact adopted is one no professional man of ordinary skill would have taken had he been 
acting with ordinary care.
114
 
This can be compared to the following examples identified by the study. 
In Report on Dr B, General Surgeon; Dr C, General Surgeon; and a District Health Board,
115
 a patient 
presented during the evening to the emergency department of a hospital with acute abdominal pain.  He 
was seen by a general surgeon (Dr B), who correctly diagnosed an irreducible hernia.  At issue was 
whether or not the hernia was also undergoing strangulation.  Dr B concluded there was no sign of 
strangulation.  That, combined with reasons why undertaking surgery at night in the circumstances would 
be risky, prompted Dr B to decide that the patient's surgery could wait until the following day.  In fact the 
patient's hernia was strangulated and, with hindsight, surgery should have been undertaken urgently 
despite the other risks. 
This case involved difficult clinical judgements.  The Commissioner's expert pointed to no protocol or 
other documentary evidence of normal practice that Dr B's decision had breached.  Nor did the expert 
explicitly consider whether Dr B's decision was consistent with a well-established professional school of 
thought.  While it is impossible in this paper to second-guess whether Dr B provided services to the 
patient with reasonable care and skill, his actions can be regarded as constituting an "error", rather than a 
"violation" as those terms are used by Alan Merry and Alexander McCall Smith.
116
 
A further example is Report on Southern District Health Board and Dr B, Surgical Registrar.
117
  This 
opinion concerned a Surgical Registrar (Dr B) who charted an incorrect dosage of methadone (recording 
the dose in millilitres instead of milligrams).  Dr B took appropriate steps to check whether the dose, 
which was based on information given to her by a patient, was correct, but should not have charted the 
methadone until those actions had been completed.  While the chain of events began with an error, it 
                                                   
114  Halsbury's Laws of England (5th ed, 2001) vol 74 Medical Professions at [24].  See in particular Bolam v 
Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 (QB) [Bolam] at 586 per McNair J.  The Bolam 
test was approved in Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246 (HL).  See also Bolitho v City and Hackney 
Health Authority [1998] AC 232 (HL). 
115  Report on Dr B, General Surgeon; Dr C, General Surgeon; and a District Health Board (Health and 
Disability Commissioner, Case 10HDC00950, 12 June 2013). 
116  Alan Merry and Alexander McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2001). 
117  Report on Southern District Health Board and Dr B, Surgical Registrar (Health and Disability Commissioner, 
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arguably resulted in a violation when Dr B charted the medicine knowing it might be incorrect (albeit that 
she gave instructions for the dose to be checked).  This type of violation should probably be regarded a 
routine rather than exceptional,
118
 and therefore, to borrow the former Commissioner Paterson's words, an 
opportunity for learning rather than lynching.
119
  
A final example is Report on Dr B, Dermatologist and a Skin Cancer Detection Company.
120
  At the 
heart of this opinion is a dermatologist (Dr B) who reported a false negative or, in other words, failed to 
diagnose a mole or lesion he had examined as a melanoma.  The Commissioner concluded that Dr B had 
breached right 4(1) of the Code despite a review of Dr B's false negative rate showing that his work fell 
well within acceptable tolerances.  The nature of screening tests is that many samples are examined with 
the prospect of detecting most, but not all, positive instances.  An example of this is the Report of the 
Ministerial Inquiry into the Under-reporting of Cervical Smear Abnormalities in the Gisborne Region.
121
  
If it is accepted that a Commissioner's opinion finding breach amounts to punishment in some form, this 
paper suggests that Report on Dr B, Dermatologist and a Skin Cancer Detection Company is the epitome 
of error being punished. 
E Legal Criticisms of the Commissioner's Jurisdiction 
Skegg has commented that:
122
 
 There is a (usually unacknowledged) tension between the [HDC] Act's objective of fairness 
in a complaints resolution and its related objectives of simplicity, speed, and efficiency.  … 
In some respects, Commissioner investigations are less fair than judicial proceedings.  … It 
would be very surprising indeed if a Commissioner's opinion would always have been the 
same, if complainants and providers had had the opportunity to present their case in the way 
that it commonplace before the courts and tribunals. 
In some respects such criticisms are also rights issues, being about the right to fairness and justice as 
opposed to patient rights.  This paper suggests that the legal criticisms able to be levelled against the 
Commissioner's jurisdiction are relevant to an analysis that applies patient rights, therapeutic 
jurisprudence, professionalism and patient safety/error prevention.  For example, opposing rights need to 
be described before they can be compared, and the way doctors experience the Commissioner's 
jurisdiction may impact upon their professionalism and patient relationships. 
1 Reasonable care and skill, and the burden of proof  
It has been said that "Right 4(1) [of the Code] encapsulates the common law standard of care in 
negligence.  In determining whether there has been a breach of right 4(1), the [Commissioner] will apply 
relevant principles of common law negligence."
123
  The relevant English law has been summarised 
above.  In New Zealand, these principles have been most clearly summarised in recent times by the court 
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in Ambros v Accident Compensation Corporation (in the context of medical error under the then 
Accident Insurance Act 1998):
124
 
 [30]  Judges have a positive duty to analyse all evidence (whether factual or expert opinion) 
to ensure it is reliable.  That is the approach adopted in all areas involving allegations of 
negligence against professionals.  There is no reason why that approach should not be 
adopted when medical error is alleged against registered health practitioners for the purpose 
of the accident compensation legislation. 
 [31]  In Sulco Ltd v E S Redit & Co Ltd [1959] NZLR 45 (CA) at 88, Henry J put the point 
as follows: 
  Since the Court must ultimately itself determine the question of negligence as a 
fact in all the circumstances of the case, I do not rest my finding on evidence as 
to the general practice of the profession alone.  The Court may come to the 
conclusion that the standards deposed to by the witness do not reach the 
standard required by law - namely, a reasonable and prudent architect engaged 
on work such as this. 
 That approach has been adopted consistently in cases of professional negligence in New 
Zealand … 
 … 
 [34]  Some suggestion can be found in earlier authorities that the standard of care in medical 
cases was generally a matter for medical judgment.  But a close reading of the authorities 
reveals that general proposition to be unsupportable.  In Bolam v Friern Hospital 
Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 at 587, it was stated that the standard of care 
was to be determined by reference to the "responsible", "reasonable" and "respectable" body 
of professional opinion.  In Bolitho the House of Lords revised the Bolam test by 
interpreting the terms "responsible", "reasonable" and "respectable" to mean that such 
opinion must have a logical basis which can be analysed by the Court:  Bolitho at 778 per 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
In addition, the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff/prosecution, and the appropriate standard of proof is 
the civil standard; that is proof to the satisfaction of the decision-maker on the balance of probabilities.
125
 
Evidence of how the Commissioner has approached the issue of reasonable care and skill can be found in 
one of the articles published by Paterson:
126
 
 The Code of Consumers' Rights - in particular the statement in Right 4(1) that "every 
consumer has the right to have services provided with reasonable care and skill" - does not 
require the Commissioner to be bound by the Bolam principle.  Rather, HDC is expected to 
form an independent opinion on the reasonableness of the care provided.  … 
 In practice, HDC is very cognisant of the reasons that underpin the Bolam principle, and 
accepts that there can often be a legitimate range of responsible opinion and practice.  We 
closely scrutinise any conflicting opinions …  We are well aware of the unfairness of 
finding a doctor 'in breach' for following a practice recognised as acceptable within the 
profession.  But we are also conscious of HDC's responsibility, as an independent guardian 
of patients' rights, to distinguish between mediocre and good practice.  On rare occasions, 
even a commonly accepted practice may, when viewed objectively, fall short of a patient's 
entitlement to "reasonable care and skill".  In the areas of assessment, diagnosis and 
treatment, we will naturally tend to defer to expert clinical opinion.  But in areas such as 
communication, referral, and follow-up, we are prepared to question accepted practice, to 
see if it reflects custom rather than care. 
Given this, one outcome of the Commissioner's jurisdiction and the Code is that, arguably, doctors in 
New Zealand are held to a higher standard than in those countries where the main remedy available to 
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patients is tort law; in which the required standard of care is framed around the Bolam test and its 
subsequent development by the House of Lords in Bolitho and other cases.
127
 
In relation to onus, the court in Stubbs
128
 seems to accept that the Commissioner starts from a neutral 
position, with no party bearing any onus.  Following an inquisitorial process the Commissioner will reach 
a preliminary view, after which a burden will shift to the party attempting to challenge that view.  
Assuming this is an accurate description of the Commissioner's method, it is at odds with the familiar 
position in New Zealand.  The general rule in civil cases is that the plaintiff must prove all the elements 
of liability that together constitute the cause of action.  The only burden which can shift from one party to 
another is what is sometimes called the 'tactical burden'.  The tactical burden simply means that a party 
stands to lose on an issue unless it produces some more evidence.
129
  That a preliminary decision can 
cause a doctor to assume the burden of proving no rights under the Code were breached seems 
particularly harsh given that the doctor may not be provided with access to all of the information 
available to the Commissioner until after a preliminary decision has been made. 
Also noteworthy is analysis undertaken by Skegg which showed that the Commissioner's opinions hold 
little (if any) weight in the HPDT.
130
  The preceding Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal held that 
the question of whether particular conduct was in breach of the Code was separate from the question 
whether that conduct amounted to a disciplinary offence,
131
 and "a breach of the Code does not 
necessarily constitute a professional disciplinary offence".
132
  Skegg's 2011 research also found that, of 
the 18 proceedings brought by the Director of Proceedings against medical practitioners before the 
HPDT, in only three did the HPDT's decision refer to the Code.  None referred to the Commissioner's 
opinion. 
In another recent case the HPDT was careful to note that only the evidence heard by it would be taken 
into account, and not the earlier opinion of the Commissioner.
133
  Nevertheless, the Commissioner's 
investigation (in particular part of the doctor's written response to the complaint) was relied upon in the 
High Court to support the Tribunal's decision.
134
 
The view can be taken (and no doubt is by some doctors) that the Commissioner applies a 'gold standard', 
as opposed to what is expected by the common law or the MCNZ.  While it is hard to argue against the 
Commissioner encouraging best practice and medical practitioners 'lifting their sights', whether 
admonishing less than best practice will result in safety/quality improvements, happier complainants and 
improved doctor-patient relationship can be questioned. 
2 Approach to factual evidence 
Report on Dr C, General Practitioner and an After Hours Clinic
135
 is an example where the 
Commissioner was required to choose between starkly conflicting accounts of a general practitioner's 
consultation with a patient.  The opinion accepted the patient's account and doubted the doctor's 
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credibility.  While the patient and doctor were separately interviewed by the Commissioner, it is not clear 
whether a transcript of the patient's interview was shown to the doctor (or vice versa).  Transcripts were 
however provided to the in-house clinical advisor engaged by the Commissioner.  It can also be inferred 
that the Commissioner's reliance on this expert reached beyond being a provider of opinion evidence in 
the true sense, to an assistant fact-finder.  For example, in his opinion the Commissioner "notes" the 
expert's comment that "The only explanation I [the expert] can see for this sequence of events is that Dr C 
has deliberately and retrospectively falsified the medical history to support his stated version of 
events".
136
 
A further example of this is Report on Dr B, Plastic Surgeon,
137
 in which the advice from the expert 
engaged by the Commissioner includes "On the balance of probabilities … I expect that there was 
discussion of the possible complications, and it is unlikely that assurances of low risk were given as 'no 
risk'." 
One criticism that can be made of the investigative process adopted by the Commissioner is the absence 
of an oral hearing and the doctor potentially not having access to all of the evidence available to the 
decision-maker. 
In relation to oral hearings, the New Zealand position is that "There is no general right to an oral hearing 
even where the decision may be significantly prejudicial".
138
  Further, the rule of natural justice 
applicable to the Commissioner's opinions demands no more than that each finding must be based upon 
some material that tends logically to show the existence of the facts consistent with the finding, and that 
any reasoning supportive of the finding is not logically self-contradictory.
139
  That said, the question 
remains whether the Commissioner's practice of determining factual contests from written submissions 
and (sometimes) separate interviews is substantively fair.  How this question is answered is likely to 
depend on how the rights at stake in the Commissioner's investigations are valued.  In relation to the need 
for such an assessment the House of Lords
140
 has affirmed the following passage from the High Court of 
Australia's decision in Kioa v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs:
141
 
In this respect the expression 'procedural fairness' more aptly conveys the notion of a flexible 
obligation to adopt fair procedures which are appropriate and adapted to the circumstances of 
the particular case.  The statutory power must be exercised fairly, that is, in accordance with 
procedures that are fair to the individual considered in the light of the statutory requirements, 
the interests of the individual and the interests and purposes, whether public or private, which 
the statute seeks to advance or protect or permits to be taken into account as legitimate 
considerations … 
The House of Lords went on to say that "an oral hearing is most obviously necessary to achieve a just 
decision in a case where facts are at issue".
142
  Consistent with this is Rose v Humbles,
143
 where a hearing 
that turned on the credibility of the subject person's evidence was held to have been unfair because it was 
conducted without oral evidence. 
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The courts in New Zealand have also recognised that, in some circumstances, it will be desirable to allow 
oral evidence in judicial review proceedings (by way of cross-examination).  In Stratford Racing Club 
Inc v Adlam
144
 the Court of Appeal said that cross-examination will "Always be permitted where it is 
necessary to enable the application for review to be decided properly and fairly" and that "Cross-
examination is particularly useful in cases where … the credibility of a deponent is in issue".
145
 
The desirability of testing evidence also has a relationship with the standard of proof that doctors would 
be subject to by the HPDT.  There the degree of satisfaction called for will vary according to the gravity 
of the allegations.  In Z v Complaints Assessment Committee,
146
 a majority of the Supreme Court held 
that the civil standard is to be applied flexibly, because it must accommodate serious allegations through 
the natural tendency to require stronger evidence before being satisfied to the balance of probability 
standard. 
In relation to the manner in which the Commissioner gathers evidence and only makes a distillation 
available by way of a provisional opinion, the court has previously criticised a Coroner for breaching 
natural justice by speaking privately with two witnesses during an inquest.
147
 
The decision in Re Erebus Royal Commission
148
 made the point (which applies equally to the 
Commissioner's opinions) that "whatever is written about someone to his discredit … is the subject of 
absolute privilege under the law of defamation, devoid though the allegation may be of any factual 
foundation … So he who has been traduced is deprived of any remedy". 
Thus doctors face an investigation process that is largely written, but where the Commissioner may 
nevertheless reject their evidence as incredible.  While this could have real consequences for a doctor's 
reputation, there is no right of appeal and, based on current precedent, limited prospect of judicial review. 
This can be compared with the next level in the disciplinary process for breached of the Code - the HRRT 
- which approaches fact-finding and credibility in the familiar adversarial way, for example:
149
 
[32]  The primary issue before the Tribunal is a stark one.  … If events did not unfold as 
alleged by the aggrieved person, the Director's case fails in its entirety.  … In this sense the 
credibility determination is the key to the outcome of this case. 
[33]  Two primary challenges to the credibility of the aggrieved person were made by Mr 
Emms either in his evidence or in cross-examination.  
It can be concluded that the Commissioner's approach to factual evidence is different from New Zealand's 
courts and tribunals, and in particular the HPDT.  This has some obvious advantages.  The 
Commissioner's process is less expensive; less dependent on lawyers; less onerous for complainants; and 
(potentially) faster.  The corollary is that it may be less satisfactory for those who are subject to adverse 
opinions.  It is suggested that this tension calls for a careful assessment of the role played by and value of 
Commissioner's opinions.  If their value to the regulatory framework for doctors is low, should that part 
of the framework be changed? 
3 Approach to expert evidence 
In his chapter 22 of Medical Law in New Zealand, the former Commissioner Paterson comments:
150
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Clinical advice is particularly valuable in relation to investigation of alleged breaches of rights 
4(1) (what is "reasonable care and skill" in such circumstances?) and 4(2) (what are the 
applicable "professional standards"?) of the Code.  Typically, during an investigation, the 
Commissioner gathers the available evidence (from clinical records and statements from 
parties and witnesses) and forwards it to a suitably qualified expert, with a request for advice 
on specific questions relating to the standard of care expected from a practitioner in such 
circumstances. 
The way in which the Commissioner engages experts consists of a document titled Guidelines for 
Independent Advisors,
151
 together with instructions and questions specific to the case.  The Guidelines for 
Independent Advisors are vague about what lies at the heart of the expert's role and do not articulate the 
contemporary (or any) incarnation of the Bolam test.  It appears most likely that the Commissioner will 
ask either direct questions seeking an opinion (such as "Should the caesarean section have been done at 
40 weeks/2 days given the history and the reduced foetal movements?"
152
), or simply whether, in the 
expert advisor's opinion, the actions in question were reasonable in the circumstances.
153
  Expert advisors 
are not asked whether another reasonable body of medical opinion exists that might give a different 
answer. 
It is suggested by this paper that there is force to criticisms about the Commissioner's use of experts 
given that their advice is invariably followed.
154
  The usual rule in an adversarial setting is that experts 
are not fact finders, and an expert opinion about a set of facts may be relied upon only if those facts are 
proved.
155
  The Law Commission has also considered the issue of court-appointed experts in the past and 
was mindful of "judicial 'descent into the arena'".
156
 
The reliance placed on expert evidence in prosecutions of health professionals has been studied by Oliver 
Quick.
157
  Based on interviews with medical experts for gross negligence manslaughter charges, Quick 
discusses how they can develop their own working rules of interpretation and analysis.  He also observed 
that experts can enjoy adopting a hybrid medic-lawyer role.  This suggests that, to ensure a fair process, 
experts should be used and managed with caution. 
4 No appeal/limited judicial review 
The Commissioner's opinions cannot be appealed under the HDC Act, leaving judicial review as the only 
available remedy.  Only two such challenges have been made:  Culverden Group Ltd v Health and 
Disability Commissioner
158
 and Stubbs.
159
  
In the first of these cases the Commissioner's opinion was essentially upheld, although the court made 
some recommendations about how the process could be improved.  In reaching its decision the court 
commented that s 27(1) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is applicable,
160
 and:
161
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[105]  … as a general rule the process the Commissioner follows as explained in his affidavit 
would satisfy the rules of natural justice and the provisions of the statute (taking account of the 
fact that the process is an investigative as against adversarial one).  A court would not 
generally interfere with any fair procedure followed by the Commissioner, given the rights of 
the Commissioner to regulate procedure … 
The application for review of the Commissioner's opinion in Stubbs was also unsuccessful, with the court 
observing:
162
 
[33]  … The Commissioner therefore has no authority to take any action affecting health care 
providers' rights or liabilities.  The Commissioner's function is to express an opinion about the 
health care provider's conduct and if appropriate refer the matter to other authorities to 
consider prosecution or other form of disciplinary process. 
[34]  Having said that I accept that the health care providers, however, do treat any negative 
opinion by the Commissioner as significant.  This is understandable given the high standing of 
the Commissioner and the understandable desire of the health care providers to guard their 
reputations closely. 
[35]  The tenor of the legislation suggests that this situation is not one where 'hard' look 
judicial review is appropriate.  The Commissioner's opinion is just that, an opinion not directly 
affecting the legal rights or liabilities of the health care provider; the prescribed process has a 
high level of 'fairness' attached with its insistence on referral of any proposed negative 
comment by the Commissioner to the health care provider before the final report is prepared; 
the Commissioner has a high level of expertise in the field; the report of the Commissioner is 
an opinion albeit well informed but where there may be genuine scope for disagreement. 
Thus the court to date has taken a deferential approach to the Commissioner's opinions and seems 
reluctant to demand too much of an inquisitorial/investigative process intended to be "simple, speedy, 
and efficient".
163
  By way of contrast, this differs from Dobson J's discussion of the relative intensity of 
review that would be brought to bear on a decision made by the MCNZ to require a doctor to undergo 
counselling.
164
 
A further decision worth noting is R v Kong,
165
 which related to a charge under s 177(e) of the Crimes 
Act 1961 that Dr Kong had attempted to pervert the course of justice by altering clinical records provided 
to the Commissioner as part of an investigation.  The court determined that inquiries undertaken by the 
Commissioner in relation to a complaint were within the scope of the 'course of justice', and thus the 
charge could be heard.  In reaching this decision the court commented that:
166
 
[44]  … the Commissioner's role at the preliminary assessment stage is not adjudicative and 
that, even at the investigative stage, it does not incorporate all of the trappings of a quasi-
judicial body. 
That the Commissioner's investigations do not include everything that would be expected from a quasi-
judicial body is agreed.  Whether the Commissioner's limited powers under s 45 of the HDC Act are 
sufficient to disqualify it from being quasi-judicial in substance (in other words whether to agree with the 
court that the Commissioner's opinions do not affect doctors' rights) is worthy of further consideration.  
In Royal Australasian College of Surgeons v Phipps the Court of Appeal noted that an independent 
examination of the conduct of a medical practitioner is "exactly the type of situation in which high 
                                                                                                                                                          
160  Culverden Group Ltd v Health and Disability Commissioner, above n 158, at [39].  Section 27(1) provides:  
"Every person has the right to the observance of the principles of natural justice by any tribunal or other public 
authority which has the power to make a determination in respect of that person's rights, obligations, or 
interests protected or recognised by law."  
161  Culverden Group Ltd v Health and Disability Commissioner, above n 158, at [105]. 
162  Stubbs v Health and Disability Commissioner, above n 102, at [33] (references to authorities omitted). 
163  HDC Act, s 6. 
164  C v Medical Council of New Zealand [2013] NZHC 825, [2013] NZAR 712 at [41]. 
165  R v Kong [2011] NZCA 537. 
166  R v Kong, above n 165, at [44]. 
  28 
 
standards of procedural fairness are expected, to support the process of making the careful professional 
judgements that are called for".
167
 
F Applying the Analytical Framework 
A patient rights perspective on the Commissioner's jurisdiction is generally positive.  The Code is 
consumer-centred and the Commissioner's processes are designed with consumers in mind.  The 
overwhelming majority of complaints that reach the Commissioner are resolved without formal 
investigation.  That said, investigation by the Commissioner can delay more formal discipline before the 
HPDT or HRRT, as well as putting patients through a duplicate process which arguably adds little when 
charges are to be brought.  The Commissioner's jurisdiction can also function to block patients' access to 
more punitive sanctions which, in some cases, may be required to heal a particular person's experience of 
the doctor-patient relationship. 
This paper considers that the Commissioner's jurisdiction is generally damaging to the ethic of 
professionalism.  While it is true that the Commissioner's opinions provide opportunities for learning and 
professional self-improvement, anecdotally this is not how they are perceived.  Particularly damaging 
may be individual doctors' experiences of the investigative process, the standards applied by the 
Commissioner, and the way in which opinions are publicised. 
There is also no evidence that the Commissioner has a widely felt positive impact on patient safety/error 
prevention.  While the subjects of an investigation are likely to be affected, it is possible the same 
outcomes could be achieved through, for example, internal investigation by a DHB.  This paper suggests 
that the impact of the Commissioner's opinions and other educational activities (whether they change the 
behaviour of doctors generally, and/or the health care systems within which doctors work) ought to be 
subject to further research.
168
 
The Commissioner's impact on therapeutic relationships also warrants further investigation.  This paper 
suggests that, provided (a) avenues exist for vindicating patient rights where resolution of a complaint 
cannot be achieved; (b) clear boundaries exist beyond which the imperatives of harm prevention and 
professional discipline take over; and (c) complaints remain an opportunity for future error prevention, 
the primary focus should be on restoring the therapeutic relationship. 
V A Broader Perspective 
A Existing Proposals 
Various suggestions for reforming the existing regulatory framework are made from time to time.  The 
Cull Review proposed combining several functions into one institution that would receive complaints, 
ensure compensation, investigate and discipline.  Wayne Cunningham carried out a cross-sectional 
survey of randomly selected doctors to develop a proposal for change.  He concluded that there was 
support for a 'complaints tribunal' providing "a single point of entry for all complaints, and which uses a 
                                                   
167  Royal Australasian College of Surgeons v Phipps [1999] 3 NZLR 1 (CA) at 12. 
168  Refer to Deanne Wong "The Health and Disability Commissioner and the development of the complaints 
resolution process" (Master of Public Policy Research Essay, Victoria University of Wellington, 2007) at 74–
77. 
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process that is transparently appropriate for both doctors and complainants."
169
  Cunningham's survey 
identified the desirable characteristics of the proposed complaints tribunal as being: 
 • Be the point of entry for all complainants 
 • Be capable of rapid response to a complaint 
 • Provide a safe environment for dialogue and mediation between complainants 
(and their advocates) and doctors (and their advocates) 
 • Be based on rights and responsibilities of both parties 
 • Be capable of rapidly resolving complaints lacking in substance, or malicious or 
vexatious complaints 
 • Seek to improve the delivery of healthcare, being able to discriminate between 
failings attributable to medical (healthcare) systems, error in the practice of 
medicine, or of wrong-doing 
 • Be aware of the limitations of medicine 
 • Consist of members or appointees who are properly trained and funded, 
appropriately experienced, and whose judgments are seen as being fair and 
appropriate 
 • Not composed ad hoc 
 • Be grounded and competent in the field in question 
 • Be capable of seeking improved outcome for the patient 
 • Be independent of the influence of the media 
As noted above, Manning has suggested liberalising access to the HRRT.
170
 
Jonathan Coates has proposed creating a "genuinely non-punitive environment" by legislating a new and 
higher statutory threshold before there can be a punitive response to deviations from acceptable standards 
of care.
171
  The HDC Act would also be amended to apply this new standard to the Commissioner, in 
conjunction with other changes designed to make the Commissioner focus more on error prevention. 
B Tentative Suggestions 
This paper also makes tentative proposals for reform which take into account the analytical framework 
applied to the Commissioner's jurisdiction, and the need to strike a balance between the potentially 
different world-views of different stakeholders.  Were these reforms to be implemented, some 
amendment would also be required to the HDC Act so that the Commissioner's functions and purpose 
remained aligned with its modified role in the regulatory framework. 
The suggestions are: 
(a)  A transparent and clear test for determining what type of conduct justifies referral to the 
MCNZ for reasons of safety or professional discipline is articulated (in legislation if 
necessary).  This is similar to one of Coates' proposals. 
(b) The Commissioner remains responsible for receiving and triaging all complaints.  Following 
preliminary investigation and triage, all complaints about conduct above the new threshold are 
referred to the MCNZ.  All other complaints are subject to a process of resolution/conciliation 
                                                   
169  Wayne Cunningham "The medical complaints and disciplinary process in New Zealand:  doctors' suggestions 
for change" (2004) 117 NZ Med J 974.  
170  Manning, above n 49. 
171  Coates, above n 81, at 384. 
  30 
 
facilitated by the Commissioner and designed to heal the doctor-patient relationship. (Patients 
who have experienced conduct which justifies sanction are more likely to be seeking a 
punitive outcome and less receptive to resolution/conciliation.  It is also appropriate that 
serious conduct is investigated and prosecuted in a forum which has appropriate procedural 
safeguards.) 
(c) Only if resolution/conciliation has been attempted and failed will the complainant have the 
option of requesting an investigation (funded by the Commissioner).  Provided the same 
conduct has not been referred to the MCNZ, at any stage following failed 
resolution/conciliation a complainant will be able to take a claim in the HRRT. 
(d) The Commissioner's powers to name parties would be abolished.  The resolution/conciliation 
process would also be without prejudice and communications within it protected. 
(e) The Commissioner would work together, and share data, with the Health Quality and Safety 
Commission in relation to every complaint. 
(f)  The Health Quality and Safety Commission would take on an additional function, similar to 
the regulator under the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992.  It would police the 
systems within which doctors work (potentially with powers to prosecute organisations).  This 
would create an enforceable expectation at the employer level of safety culture and open 
disclosure. 
In other words, the Commissioner's jurisdiction would assume a therapeutic focus.  Serious conduct 
would be taken out of the jurisdiction to be dealt with by the MCNZ.  Where resolution/conciliation 
failed, complainants would be able to access either an investigation by the Commissioner or the HRRT at 
their election.  All complaints would feed into the Health Quality and Safety Commission, so providing 
opportunities for error prevention.  A systems approach to patient safety would be promoted by 
expanding the Health Quality and Safety Commission's functions to include enforcement as well as 
promotion. 
VI Conclusion 
Medicine is an environment where some errors will always occur:
172
 
 Health care is an unusually complex system.  Some features that predispose to errors and 
aggravate their consequences coexist and interact to a degree that is seldom found in other 
human endeavours.  … 
 Errors are intrinsic to normal cognitive processes.  Moreover, an error thought to be 
preventable in an individual case may, in fact, be statistically inevitable in the career of a 
physician.  … 
It is also a profession that, understandably, is subject to significant regulation.  It can be argued that the 
three main pillars of such regulation are patient rights, safety/quality and discipline.  The Commissioner 
is the primary institution through which patient rights are affirmed and protected.  The role played by the 
Commissioner also intersects with (or overlaps) other parts of the regulatory framework and other 
interests, such as the trust which underpins therapeutic relationships.  William B Runciman and Alan F 
Merry have written that:
173
 
                                                   
172  William B Runciman and Alan F Merry "Error, Blame and the Law in Health Care - An Antipodean 
Perspective" (2003) 138 Ann Intern Med 974. 
173  Ron Paterson "Complaints and quality:  handle with care" (2004) 117 NZ Med J 970. 
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 Complaints offer a window of opportunity to improve health services.  However, emerging 
evidence shows that complaints are not necessarily the treasure trove that quality 
improvement gurus would have us believe.  Instead of providing reconciliation and closure, 
complaints can have toxic effects on patients and doctors. 
This paper asked whether the Commissioner's jurisdiction was fit for purpose.  In addressing this 
question, the importance of understanding the purpose and its relationship with the different interests and 
perspectives involved has emerged.  This paper suggests that the purpose of the Commissioner's 
jurisdiction should be revisited, in conjunction with making some changes to how complaints about 
doctors are dealt with.  It is suggested this may benefit doctors and patients, as well as the systems and 
workplaces which provide the context within which doctor-patient relationships take place. 
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VIII Appendix 
Opinion A B C D E F G 
Report on Dr B, General Practitioner and a 
General Practice (Health and Disability 
Commissioner, Case 12HDC01483, 12 July 2013) 
 
(in-
house) 
 X X 
("more likely than 
not" at [59]) 
X Named to MCNZ and 
DHB 
4(1) - Missed diagnosis of bowl cancer / 
failure to investigate differential diagnosis 
of bowl cancer. 
Report on Dr D, Obstetrician and a District Health 
Board (Health and Disability Commissioner, Case 
11HDC00515, 11 July 2013) 
   
(colleague) 
X X Named to MCNZ and 
professional body 
4(1) - Missed diagnosis of foetal growth 
restriction / decision not to monitor more 
closely or deliver earlier. 
Report on Dr A, Psychiatrist and Southern District 
Health Board (Health and Disability Commissioner, 
Case 11HDC01072, 9 July 2013) 
   X 
("balance of 
probabilities" at 
[11]) 
X Named to MCNZ  No breach 
Report on Dr C, General Surgeon and Capital and 
Coast District Health Board (Health and Disability 
Commissioner, Case 09HDC01932, 28 June 2013) 
  X X X Named to MCNZ and 
professional body 
4(1) - Failure to adequately assess mental 
suitability for surgery / failure to consult 
psychiatrist. 
Report on Dr B, Dermatologist and a Skin Cancer 
Detection Company (Health and Disability 
Commissioner, Case 11HDC00700, 28 June 2013) 
  X X X Named to MCNZ, DHB 
and professional body 
4(1) - Missed diagnosis of melanoma. 
4(1) - Failure to recommend excision of 
lesions. 
Report on Southern District Health Board and Dr 
B, Surgical Registrar (Health and Disability 
Commissioner, Case 11HDC00710, 28 June 2013) 
  X X X Named to MCNZ 4(1) - Prescribing error / failure to check 
appropriate dosage of methadone. 
4(5) 
Report on Dr B, Plastic Surgeon (Health and 
Disability Commissioner, Case 11HDC01438, 21 
June 2013) 
  X X 
("more likely than 
not" at [5] and 
[70]) 
 
(in 
favour 
of 
doctor) 
Named to MCNZ, DHB 
and professional body / 
Performance assessment 
4(1) - Substandard treatment of post-
operative infection. 
6(1)(f) 
4(5) 
4(2) 
Report on Dr D, General Practitioner; Dr E, 
General Practitioner; and a Medical Centre (Health 
and Disability Commissioner, Case 12HDC00203, 
 
(in-
house) 
 X X X Named to MCNZ and 
DHB / Performance 
assessment 
4(1) - Failure to take reasonable steps to 
follow up referral. 
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21 June 2013) 
Named to MCNZ and 
DHB 
4(1) - Failure to take reasonable steps to 
follow up referral. 
Report on West Coast District Health Board and Dr 
B, Physician (Health and Disability Commissioner, 
Case 10HDC01344, 20 June 2013) 
  X X X Named to MCNZ No breach 
Report on Dr B, General Practitioner (Health and 
Disability Commissioner, Case 12HDC00518, 13 
June 2013) 
X - X X  Named to MCNZ, DHB 
and professional body / 
Director of Proceedings 
4(2) 
2 
Report on Dr B, General Surgeon; Dr C, General 
Surgeon; and a District Health Board (Health and 
Disability Commissioner, Case 10HDC00950, 12 
June 2013) 
   X X Named to MCNZ and 
professional body / 
Performance assessment 
4(1) - Decision that symptoms did not 
require immediate surgery. 
Named to MCNZ and 
professional body / 
Performance assessment 
4(1) - Decision that symptoms did not 
require immediate surgery. 
Report on Bay of Plenty District Health Board; Dr 
C, Physician; and Dr D, Medical Registrar (Health 
and Disability Commissioner, Case 10HDC00855, 
30 April 2013) 
  X X 
("more likely than 
not" at [167]) 
X Named to MCNZ and 
professional body 
4(1) - Missed diagnosis of incarcerated 
femoral hernia. 
 
Named to MCNZ and 
professional body / 
Performance assessment 
4(1) - Missed diagnosis of incarcerated 
femoral hernia (including substandard 
investigation and poor communication 
with responsible consultant). 
4(2) 
Report on Dr B, General Practitioner (Health and 
Disability Commissioner, Case 11HDC00237, 26 
March 2013) 
 
(in-
house) 
 X X 
("balance of 
probabilities" at 
[102], [103], [109], 
[115] and [120]; 
"more likely than 
not" at [118]) 
 Named to MCNZ, DHB 
and professional body / 
Performance assessment / 
Director of Proceedings 
4(1) - Failure to take reasonable care when 
prescribing codeine. 
4(2) 
4(2) 
2 
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Report on Dr B, General Practitioner (Health and 
Disability Commissioner, Case 11HDC00843, 19 
March 2013) 
 
(in-
house) 
 X X X Named to MCNZ, DHB 
and professional body / 
Performance assessment 
4(1) - Missed diagnosis of bladder cancer / 
failure to investigate differential diagnosis 
of bladder cancer. 
Report on Dr A, Medical Practitioner and a 
Medical Centre (Health and Disability 
Commissioner, Case 10HDC01250, 22 February 
2013) 
 
(in-
house) 
 X X 
("more likely than 
not" at [105]) 
 Named to MCNZ and 
DHB / Performance 
assessment 
4(1) - Missed diagnosis of prostate cancer / 
failure to take reasonable steps to follow 
up tests. 
4(2) 
4(5) 
Report on Dr C, General Practitioner and an After 
Hours Clinic (Health and Disability Commissioner, 
Case 11HDC00871, 11 December 2012) 
 
(in-
house) 
 X X  Named to MCNZ, DHB 
and professional body / 
Performance assessment / 
Director of Proceedings 
4(1) - Failure to examine vital signs / 
examination that was not clinically 
indicated (in breach of sexual boundaries). 
6(1)(e) 
7(1) 
4(2) 
6(1) 
7(1) 
1(1) 
4(2) 
4(4) 
4(5) 
Report on Dr C, Psychiatrist (Health and Disability 
Commissioner, Case 10HDC01018, 26 November 
2012) 
  X X 
("balance of 
probabilities" at 
[160]; "more likely 
than not" at [169], 
[176] and [192]) 
 Named to MCNZ, DHB 
and professional body / 
Performance assessment / 
Director of Proceedings 
4(1) - Failure to provide therapeutic 
relationship (in breach of sexual 
boundaries). 
2 
4(2) 
4(2) 
4(4) 
Report on Dr C, Orthopaedic Surgeon; Ms D, 
Registered Nurse; Ms E, Registered Nurse; and a 
Private Hospital (Health and Disability 
Commissioner, Case 10HDC00158, 14 November 
2012) 
  X X 
("more likely than 
not" at [235]) 
 Named to MCNZ and 
professional body 
4(1) - Failure to conduct emergency 
surgery as soon as reasonably possible. 
4(2) 
4(5) 
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Report on Bay of Plenty District Health Board and 
Dr C, Psychiatrist (Health and Disability 
Commissioner, Case 10HDC00805, 1 October 
2012) 
  X X X Named to MCNZ  4(2) 
4(5) 
Report on Canterbury District Health Board; Dr E, 
Consultant Neurosurgeon; Dr F, Neurosurgical 
Trainee/Registrar; Ms I, Registered Nurse; Ms J, 
Registered Nurse; and Ms K, Registered Nurse 
(Health and Disability Commissioner, Case 
09HDC01565, 5 September 2012) 
  X X X Named to MCNZ No breach 
Named to MCNZ No breach 
A If an expert had been engaged to provide advice about whether a doctor had breached right 4(1) of the Code ("Every consumer has the right to have services provided 
with reasonable care and skill") 
B Whether the Commissioner's opinion was consistent with any advice received from an expert engaged by him. 
C Whether the doctor submitted any independent expert evidence. 
D What, if any, comment was made about onus/the burden of proof. 
E Whether the Commissioner made a material factual finding that was in dispute between the complainant and doctor. 
F What follow-up actions were taken. 
G Whether a doctor was found to have breached right 4(1) of the Code and, if so, how. 
 
 
